Competition Policy in Japan and Australia : A comparative legal study by 加藤 良三
Nanzan hogaku， Vol. 10， No. 2 (1986) 256 
COMPETITION POLICY 
IN JAPAN AND AUSTRALIA 
A comparative legal study-
Ryozo Kato 
Professor of Law， Faculty of Law， Nanzan University 
Contents 
1. Preface .......... . 
n. What is the Japanese Competiton Policy? . 
(1) Fundamental Thinking . 
(2) 1953 Amendment and the Subsequent Economic Concentration 
Appearance of Big Corporate Groups-....... . 
(A) American and British Experiences . 
(B) Japanese Experience . 
( i) Sharp Mitigation of Merger Law ...... . 
(ii) Merger Movement-Way to Economic 
Concentration ...... . 
(ii) The Commission's Weakened Enforcement 
of Amended Merger Provisions . . . . . . . . . 
皿.Does the Anti-monopoly Policy include the Market 
Structure Control? ..... . 
(1)“Crazy Price-increase" and Corporate Social 
Responsibility . . 
(2) The Commission's Compulsory Investigation of 
Market Structure 
-Confirmation of the Real Existence of Big 
Corporate Groups-..... . 
(3) Tentative Amendment Draft of the Act 
-Review of Anti-monopoly Policy-....... . 
、 ? ， ，?? ?、
255 
N. Enactment of Provisions for Market Structure Control.. 
(1) Legal Control over a Monopolistic Situation .. 
(A) Requirements for a Monopolistic Situation . 
(B) Investigation of and Necessary Measures for， 
a Monopolistic Situation............................ 
(C) Negative Requirements ................................ . 
(2) Strengthened Prevention from Economic Concentration . 
(A) Limition of Merger ............................... . 
(B) Strengthened Limitation of Share Holding by 
a Big Company.... 
(i) The Limitation of the Total Amount . 
(i) Strengthened Maximum of Share Holding 
by Financial Companies............................ . 
V. Conclusion .................................................. . 
(1) Summary of ]apanese Anti.monopoly and Point in Question.. . 
(2) Comparative Study with Australian Law . . 
1. Preface 
The recently increased relationship between Japan and Australia 
in both cultural and economical aspects has given birth to various 
significant institutes and systems for the better understanding of Japan 
in Australia. For example， the establishment of the Australia-Japan 
Foundation， the Japanese Study Centre， the Japanese Language Depart-
ment in major Australian universities， the Japanese Studies Association 
of Australia， etc. On the contrary， unfortunately， there has been， it
seems to me， very little approach to the Australian social systems 
from Japanese side up to now. However， Australian studies from 
Japanese side hereafter could be expected to a considerable extent 
becasue of the gradually increasing necessity for systematic， not 
individual， study of Australia， above al from the stand point of social 
science. One distinguishing example is a proposed establishment of 
“the Australian Studies Centre" (a temporary name) in Nagoya with 
financial assistances from the Australia-Japan Foundation， the Nanzan 
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University and other expected contributions from the business world， 
which is now in the preparation for the opening in May 1986. 
Under such good circumstances， ifmy report could be of some 
help to your understanding of Japanese Anti-monopoly Policy， itwould 
be a great pleasure to me. 
My theme is too wide to speak in detai1s of the whole in this 
Seminar， so 1 am obliged to restrict the contents of my report to the 
following two points: 
a. What is the Japanese Anti-monopoly Policy? 
b. Does the Anti-monopoly Policy inc1ude the market structure 
control? 
After 1 mention the above topics 1 will try to make c1ear of 
differences between the Australian Competion Polciy and the Japanese 
Anti-monopoly Policy as my conc1usion. 
n. What is the Japanese Competition Policy? 
(1) Fundamental Thinking 
It is well known that an economic order which the Japanese Govern-
ment has been constantly endeavoring to achieve as its political goal 
under the Anti-monopoly Law since the legislature of 1947， is“Free 
Competitive Economic Orderヘwhichis called “free market economy 
systeロ1".
Section 1 of the Act cdncerning Prohibition of Private Monopoly 
and Maintenance of Fair Tade 1947 (Cth) 1) (hereafter quoted as“Anti-
monoply Act") makes this clear， which is a purpose provision， and 
reads as follows: 
“This Act， by prohibiting private monoplization， unreasonable rest-
raint of trade and unfair business practices， by preventing the excessive 
concentration of economic power and by eliminating unreasonable 
restraint of production， sale， price， technology， and the like， and al 
other undue restriction of business activities through combinations， 
(3) 
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agreements and otherwise， aims to promote free and fair competition， 
to stimu1ate the initiative of enterpreneurs， to encourage business 
activities of enterprises， to heighten the leve1 of emp10yment and 
peop1e's rea1 income， and thereby to promot the democratic and who1e-
some deve10pment of the nationa1 economy as well as to assure the 
interests of consumers in general." 
However， further exp1anation of this objective provision would be 
necessary in order to understand the ]apanese Anti-monopoly Policy 
better. A great majority of opinions， including the Fair Trade Commis-
sion (hereafter cited as“the Commission") and courts' judgements are 
fol1owing: 
The ]apanese Anti-monoply Policy is composed of three major 
poles: the first is a prohibition of“private monopolization"， the second 
is that of “unreasonable restraint of trade" and the third is that of 
“unfair business practices". 
In this opinion， provisions for the limitation of mergers and 
acquisition of assets are completely excluded from major positions， 
and on1y treated as supp1ementary provision， because of their sharp 
mitigation by the 1953 Amendment which will be discussed 1ater. 
Thus， not only a great majority of lega1 scho1ars but a1so judges 
are confident that severe 1ega1 contro1 over these three kinds of 
prohibited conducts is vitally necessary for the maintenance and 
furtherance of “fair and free competition"， which is the direct objective 
of the Act aiming at the maintenance of“free competitive economic 
order"， and that the very maintenance of competition of this kind 
would lead to an interest of genera1 consumer i. e.“public interest" 
as出eultimate objective of the Act.2) 
As a resu1t， based upon the above mentioned view， the enforcement 
of the Act by the Commission has been main1y directed to contraven-
tion cases of private monopo1ization (s. 2 (5)， 3 former part)3)， 
unreasonab1e restraint of trade (s. 2 (6)， 3 1atter part)4) and unfair 
business practices (s. 2 (9)， 19)め;on the contrary， the Commission 
has not been so severe in the enforcement of such sup1ementa1 preven-
(4) 
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tive provisions as the limitation of acquiring shares (s. 10)， merger 
(s. 15) or the limitation of acquiring business assets (s. 16)， which are 
thought only as devices for preventing from restraint of competition. 
Moreover， as a common illegality requirement to al those con-
ducts is an uncompetitive effect， i. e. a substantial restriction of the 
competition in a relevant market or a threatening to hinder “fair 
competition" in a market， ithas been generally thought that the Anti-
monopoly Act is composed of only control over anti-competitive con-
ducts， and that it contains no control over market structure itself， 
notwithstanding that a phrase，“preventing from the excessive concent-
ration of economic power" is clearly included in the purpose provision 
(s. 1). 
(2) 1953 Amendment and Suhsequent Economic Concentration 
-Appearance of Big Corporate Groups-
(A) American and British Experiences 
Needless to say， merger is the cheapest， easiest and mos凶teffort-
less but most effective wa町Ytωo economic concentration under a rhetoric 
Oぱf“
were and are stil now 巴nt出hu凶1路凶s討i拘as杭ti比cdesires or demands for mitigation 
Oぱfme町rg伊ercontrol to the g伊ov刊ernmentand the legislature from business 
world. 
Merger control should be in its nature a necessary and fundamental 
requirement for the maintenance of decentralized market and at least 
for the prevention from further economic concentration. Nevertheless， 
in major industrialized countries， such as the U. S. A. merger control 
gave its way to the strong claim for its mitigation in the practical 
application of merger statute (old section 7 of Clayton Act) by the 
Supreme Court.6) Later the Congress enacted a new merger statute 
(new section 7-Celler-Kehauver Anti-Merger Act) in 1950 in order 
to stop merger movements， but even the new statute could not stop 
it. It rather allowed the appearance of so-called “Big Two Hundred 
Corporations" by the traditional judicial lawmaking in the statutory 
(5 ) 
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interpretation.7) 
Under such circumstances Blake and Jones stated in their common 
paper titIed，“1n Defense of Antitrust" in 1965 that antitrust has not 
only the economic purpose， but also the political purpose， that is， 
competitive market exists not only because of encouraging economic 
efficiency and substantial development， but also because of promoting 
the very important political purpose; the purpose of the antitrust 
policy is to maintain a functionally workable economy without the 
establishment of many political supervising organizations; if econmic 
concentration goes on with no interruption， the strengthening of the 
governmental control over economy wiIl be inevitably demanded， so 
the antitrust must function to forestall the concentration of economic 
power in order to avoid this; the reliance on competitive market 
functions to adjust material happiness， which is brought to us through 
it， and our discredit upon the concentration of political and economical 
powers into a particular private person or the Gov巴rnment;the political 
purpose of antitrust is that it must give the greatest freedom of 
opportunity to consumers， and present and future enterprisers， while 
competition system promotes unrestrained competition or rivalry in 
dealings. 
1n short， Blake & Jones' opinion is that， though the economic 
purpose of increased economic efficiencies may contribute to economic 
interest of general consumer， the possible excessive concentration of 
powerful economic powers into a specified or a few corporations (big 
business)， and the possible destruction of competitive system as a 
result would not only deprive individusls from freedom of fair business 
opportunity， but also give birth to the strengthened governmental 
control over the economy as counter power， which would lead to a 
crisis of destruction of democracy in the resul t; therefore， the Anti-
trust Law has to protect a competitive economic system， lest the 
system should incline toward either， in order that such a political 
crisis may be avoided.9) 
As mentioned above， amendment towards mitigation or judicial 
(6) 
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emasculation of merger control would lead directly and easily to the 
concentration of economic power and the destruction of competitive 
system， and would give cause to a number of problems， not only social， 
but also political， such as every kind of pollusion， abuse of control 
powers by big business， loss of independence of local governments， 
concentration of political powers， adhesion of economic to political 
powers or. strengthened power of bureaucracy etc.， which would result 
in a threat enough to destroy the democratic political system.O-2) In 
this regard the United Kingdom also has recently acknowledged harmful 
influences of the economic concentration， and enacted the Fair Trading 
Act 1973， including merger control provisions.10) 
Cunningham， for example， stated: Real arguments of competition 
poIicy and law do not exist in economic matters， but poIitical and 
social matters to be considered， because no more political and social 
freedom would be able to exist， where economic freedom has been 
deprived; economic freedom can be maintained by the prevention of 
economic power from the concentration into a few persons; merger is 
more undesirable than cartel， because the latter casues only a tempo-
rary lessening of existing competition， while the former gives birth to 
an eternal disapppearance of exist，ing and potential competition from a 
market.ll) 
Now， itcould be said from the above mention that merger control 
for the prevention from a concentration of economic power is an es-
sential and fundamental r色quirementfor the competition system， i.e. 
“market economyぺwhichis aimed at as the political purpose or goal. 
(B) Japanese Experience 
(i) Sharp Mitigation of Merger Law 
Original merger provisions (s. 10， 14， 15， 16) were amended for a 
.sharp mitigation by strong desires from the business world in 1953.12) 
The existing amended merger law， which includes provisions for limit-
ing amalgamation (s. 15) or acquisition of shares or assets by a 
company (s. 10， 16) or by a person other than a company (s. 14)， 
(7) 
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prohibits only such an amalgamation or an acquisition as it is substa-
ntially to restrict the competition in a specified market as the result， 
or as is made by way of an unfair business practices (s. 2 (9)， 19) .13) 
As already mentioned， 1953 amendment dropped the position of anti 
merger provisions of the Act from major statutes for the impediment 
to concentration of economic power down to only supplemental ones 
for preventing from the restriction of competition. Thus， an easy way 
to merger， inother words， economic concentration has been opened to 
the business world. 
(i) Merger Movement-Way to Economic Concentration 
The first merger movement in ]apan after the Second Wor1d War， 
it is said， began nearly in 1947， when the first amendment for miti-
gation of the original section 15 took place. But， thereafter， the 
movement was very much accelerated by the second amendment of the 
provision of 1953. According to the Commission's investigation report 
on corporate merger movement， merger movement in ]apan can be 
divided into the following three periods:14) 
1 : The first period (1947 ~ 1959) 
This period is named socaUed“the pregnant period" which means a 
term from the end of the Second World War to just before the beginn-
ing of big economic growth. The following merger cases are repre-
sentative examples for this period: new establishments (or birth) of 
Shin Mitsubishi Shoji Co. and Shin Mitsui Bussan Co.， consolidations 
by Sumitomo Kinzoku KogyδCo. of Kokura SeikδCo.， and by Marubeni 
Co. of Takashimaya nda Co .
2 : The second period (1960~ 1963) 
Merger movement in this second period was very active and 
vigorous， and only in three years the number of mergers increased 
twice: it rapidly increased from 591 cases in 1960 to 997 cases in 1963. 
This period is called “the age of small scale mergersヘbecausea 
company's capital after merger was less than 10 million Australian 
dollars in most cases. 
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3 : The third period (1964，-，1970) 
T包括 thirdperiod is named “the age of big scale mergersぺ Just 
then the Japanese economy was enjoying so called “High Growth of 
Economyヘandpeople had much expectation of their annual income 
increasing substantially twice under the influence of optimistic esti-
mates of prospective economic growth. 
However， this period also， at the same time， iscalled “the age 
of student movements". Jt was a hard period when many university 
students took part in radical movements for criticizing existing univer-
sity systems (above al， inmedical school)， national defense policy of 
the Government (especially in regard to 1970 renewal of American-
Japan Security Pact)， or impeaching big companies with air or water 
pollution， injuries by medicines， and others戸)
At any rate， major mergers which took place for this term are 
new-establishment of Shin-Nihon Seitetsu Co.， and Daiichi Kangyo 
GinkδCo.， and merger cases of Mitsubishi Juko Co. and Kanematsu 
GδshδCo.， etc. 
A distinguished feature for this period is pointed out to be the 
remarkable increase in the number of conglomerate merger. 
The number of each merger type which took place for two years 
(1969"" 1970) can be shown in percentage as follows: 16) 
EF--三竺~l 1969 1970 
Horizonta! Merger 467 (34.7幼| 471 (36.19扮
Vertica! Merger 即仰勿)I 107 ( 8.2タ)
Cong!omerate Merger 的仰必)I 574 (44.19的
Others 郎(7.9タ) I 150 (11. 5%) 
Tota! 
As indicated in the above table， the percentage of conglomerate 
merger is 44 to 47% and nearly half of the total number of mergers; 
whi1e that of horizontal merger remained only 35 to 36%. This in-
dicates a tendency of the diversification of management， which was 
(9) 
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prevail in the business wor1d at that time under strong influency of 
American corporate management system and merger tendency.17) Of 
course， above mentioned mergers do not inc1ude a partial acquisition 
of shares， so they mean only “merger in the narrower sense of the 
wordぺthatis， amalgamation or consolidation， itshould be noted. 
Now， such a range of recent large-scale mergers seems to have 
been politically promoted for the purpose of strengthening corporate 
competitive abilities in overseas trade， or as a countermeasure for 
opening domestic capital market to foreign countries， sometimes under 
the name of“industry reorganization" or sometimes under the govern-
mental leadership which is caUed “Gyoseishido" . 
On the other hand， partial acquisition of shares (“loose merger") 
in this period also seems to have advanced to a significant extent 
under the governmental encouragement of“mutual share holding" as a 
kind of countermeasure for open capital market. However， unfort・
unately the actual situation could not be c1arified until the Commis-
sion's report on the compulsory investigation of economic concen-
tratioIl (this problem wi1 be discussed later). 
(ii) The Commission's Weakened Enforcement of Amended 
Merger Provisions 
Warren Pengil1ey， the former Commissioner of TPC criticizes in 
his recent paper18) the direct or indirect interventions of the Govern-
ment and politicians to the enforcement of competition law， and says 
the following: 19) 
“Lawyers assume that a statute reflects the realities of political 
power and .the legislative enactment ensures enforcement. The evi-
dence， however， suggests that the competition policy expressed in Part 
N of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) does not and wil1 not have 
complete policial support. There are many ways in which governments 
can inhibit the effective enforcement of competition policy， inc1uding， 
but not limited to， the formal legal means provided in the Act. The 
Trade Practices Commission is structured as an independent statutory 
(10) 
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authority， but in practice， itis dependent significantly on the extent 
of government commitment to the causes for which it was established". 
In Japan also， the Commission is structured as an independent 
agency for the enforcement of anti-monopoly policy， but it is virtually 
dependent upon the government and substantially apt to be directly or 
indirectly subject to sup巴riorgovernment agency's opinion or sugges-
tion. Above al， inregard to the relationship between anti-monopoly 
policy in charge of the Commission and industrial structure policy in 
charge of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (hereafter 
cited as MITI). According to the MITI's opinion important matters 
concerned with the structure of industry should not be entrusted to 
the Commission， so that the MITI has often given and gives even now 
direct guidances to the industry under the name of so called il reputed 
“administrative guidance" with no power， but de facto with the binding 
power; especially in the area of merger law having so much connection 
with industrial structure such guidances are given in most cases with 
no regard to the Commission's opinion.20) 
Such a virtually inferior position of the Commission has been 
reflected and is stil in the weakened enforcement of the Act， parti-
cularly in merger law.21) Common “illegality" test to al mergers 
including a partial shares or assets acquisition is “to be substantially 
to restrict the competition in a specified market as the result" (in 
other words， the merger or acquisition would result in being likely to 
restrict the competition ..... substantial1y) or“to be by way of an 
unfair method of trade".22) No cases has been challenged on the ground 
of the contravention of the latter test. The former test is of much 
importance in the enforcement of merger law. The requirement of 
“substantial restriction of the competition" is the same as other 
prohibited conducts， such as private monopolization or restraint of 
trade， but the only difference is “to be substantially to restrict" or 
“would resul t in being likely to restrict". 
To the meaning of“substantial restriction of the competition" is 
already given a judicial interpretation in the TohδCo. case，23) in which 
、 、 ， ，??? ?、
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Tokyo Higher Court says: 
“‘Substantia11y to restrict the competition in a specified market' 
means to bring about a situation in which a particular enterprise or 
trade association would be able to control a relevant market through 
exerting its own influence upon price， quality， quantity and any other 
terms with a considerab1e extent of freedom， inother words， a state 
in which there wou1d be no hope for its competitiors to be ab1e to 
keep their business going on with enough profits， in which they can 
decide price， quality and quantity at their own choice".24) 
I1legality test in merger case is whether a merger or an acquisition 
wou1d be like1y to bring about such a situation (i. e.， a position to 
contro1 a market) as the resu1t. 
Now 1et us examine the practica1 enforcement of merger 1aw after 
1953 Amendment. 
(a) Merger Case (s. 15) 
A large number of mergers were applied for clearance to the 
Commission.26) C1earance was granted to a1most a1 applications except 
one. This one is the famous 1arge sca1e merger of Yawata Seitetsu Co. 
and Fuji Seitetsu Co.， which gave birth to a new company， Shin Nihon 
Seitetsu Co. in 1969. This is the on1y case that the Commission has 
decided up to now. However， the Commission granted c1earance 
even to this case at the end， so that there is no merger case that was 
decided to be i1lega1 by the Commission. In this case the Commission 
says: 
“‘is substantia11y to restrict the competition in a re1evant market 
. . . . 'means that a specified enterprise is Iikely to be in a position 
to control a market through the market structure changed into less 
competitive condition than before merger， in which his competitor 
wou1d no more be ab1e to carry on business independent1y， since he 
wou1d monopolize the market or have enough inf1uence on them to 
decide price， quality， quantity or any other terms at his wil1， and with 
a considerable extent of freedom."2(1) 
(12) 
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The Commission， after the above mention and the examination of 
four articles in question，2'T) considered，“the new company will not 
be in a position to control the market， and therefore， itwi1 not 
restrict substantially the competition if‘any competitor with effective 
checking power'， who can carry on business independently， comes into 
existence by the realization of counter plans28) proposed by both com-
panies." 
In short， the Commission granted c1earance to this largest scale 
merger on the slender ground that the realization of proposed counter 
plans would bring about the existence of“competitors with effective 
checking power"， nevertheless the effectivity of competitors' checking 
power was nothing but expectation and there was no security to such 
plans' realization. Not only this， but also the Commission unnecessarily 
subdivided the relevant market when judging the substantial anti-
competitive effect， so that the Commission fai!ed to take the powerful 
integrated economic power into consideration， which a newly born 
company would have as the merger's result.29) 
At加 yrate， inthe end， the Commission emasculated section 15 
through having deprived it of the very important function of effective 
prevention from economic concentration in the course of the mitigated 
enforcement. Thus， there has been left no drag against mergers; 
therefore， al mergers succeeded with no accusation from the Com-
mission.30) 
(b) Other Merger Ca8e (8. 10， 14， 16) 
Sections 10， 14 and 16 are provided in the Act as merger provi-
sions other than section 15.31) It is section 10 (limitation of share-
holding) that is the most important of these three provisions， because 
the anticompetitive effect in case of section 10 contravention is sub司
stantially the same as section 15 contravention. Section 10 prohibits 
a company from acquiring or holding the shares of other domestic 
company， where the acquisition would result in being likely to restrict 
the competition substantially in a relevant market. 
(13) 
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Likewise， there is only one case that the Commission decided. But 
this case is the early case (1951) before the Amendment of 1953 Act. 
Since then no share acquisition or holding case has been decided by 
the Commission. This seems to have had much connection with the 
above mentioned emasculation of section 15 in the practical enforce-
ment of section 10. As for section 16 (limitation of transfer of 
business or business assets) no case can be found up to now. 
Thus， merger movements， as already mentioned， could go .on with 
no interference by the law. 
]1[. Does the Anti-monopoly Policy include the 
~arket Structure Control ? 
- Necessity for Review of the Policy-
(1)“Crazy Price Increase" and Corporate Social Responsibility 
The outbreak of the first Middle East War and the subsequent 
OPEC's ammouncement of a range of sharp oil price increase gave 
not only huge damages to the ]apanese economy which was in the 
middst of“High Economic Growth"， but also substantial bad influences 
and immeasurable damages to the people， that is， one-sided， simult-
aneous and continuous price increase of car petroleum and burning oil， 
which took place immediately after the OPEC's announcement， but far 
before the OPEC's affection to ]apan， and simultaneous priceincrease 
of other daily necessaries with no direct relation with the announce-
ment， and in addition， sudden disappearance of these commodities from 
al supermarkets in a day， which were in plenty in market just before 
the time-all these attacked ]apanese consumers at a time. ]apan fel 
into a kind of panic. The Prime Minister at that time， Takeo Fukuda 
described this confused situation as a“crazy price increase". Why such 
a situation occurred was quite ununderstandable to the people. Mass 
media set about making c1ear real causes and reasons. Through daily 
newspaper or TV news a number of evildoings of big companies， such 
(14) 
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as prevalence of illegal price cartels， undue indisposition to sel goods 
in various distribution levels， undue corner in raw materials and living 
necessaries， etc.， were disc10sed to the people one after another. In 
addition， a number of other malignant wrongs by big companies， such 
as unlawful make司upsettlement of accounts， tax evasion or i1egal 
tnrowing away of harmful materials etc. were disc10sed at the same 
time. 
Thus，“crazy price increase" problem naturally developed into a 
more important problem of “corporate social responsibility"， especially 
of big business.33，3的
(2) The Commission's Compulsory Investigation of Market 
Structure 
-Confirmation of the Real Existence of Big Corporate 
Groups-
Whi1e having set about exposing a range of unlawful cartel agree-
ments，呂町 the Commission， not always having been familiar with the 
real extent of economic concentration， began investigating the existing 
market structure， laying stress on“big ten comprehensive trading 
companiesぺwhichare called “SogふShδshaヘir order to know the 
actual circumstances. The main aim of this investigation consisted in 
c1arifying points in question from the stand point of antimonopoly 
policy， especially paying attention to the following matters: (i) the 
extent to which the Sδgo・Shoshahas control over its customers， (ii) 
the tendency of corporate group formation with which the Sδgδ-Shosha 
has a c10se relation， (ii) the extent to which the Sogo・Shoshatakes 
advantage of its favourable trading position in relation to customers. 
The result of this investigation， briefly summarized， isas follows: 
the Sδgo・Shδshawas actively engaged in the acquisition of shares and 
the sending of directors with the intention to secure the business 
enlargement in every field of industry， which resulted in having a 
number of subsidaries and also promoting corporate group formation.36) 
Regarding the relation between the Sogo・Shoshaand big six corporate 
(15) 
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groups (Mitsubishi， Mitsui， Sumitomo， Fuyδ， Daiichi Kangin， Sanwa) 
the Sδgδ-Shosha played an important part in strengthening the group 
to which it belonged. Each group has socalled“president meeting" 
which is regularly held to strengthen mutual cooperation among mem-
bers， and to discuss common important matters within the same group. 
The SogふShoshaand a big bank are the major members of each group. 
Within the same group the mutual shareholding and sending of directors 
prevailed.37) The investigation made it clear what a position these six 
big corporate groups occupied in the whole ]apanese economy. The 
data evidences how powerful position these corporate groups occupy 
in the ]apanese economy， which seems to be no less powerful than the 
position occupied by the old Zaibatsu at that time.制
As the result of the investigation the Commission pointed out the 
following points in question:叫
(i) Points in question regarding corporate integration of the Sogo・
Shosha 
There are possibi1ities of interference with independent enter-
prisers' business activities， selection of customers， and undue extortion 
of unreasonable profits or exclusion of outsiders from dealing， which 
are due to so much difference in dealing position between the Sogδ-
Shosha and its subordinate companies. And there are another possi-
bility of strengthened market control power of each goods dealt with， 
and market operations such as price manipulation， which are due to the 
extremely high position of the Sogo-Shosha in domestic and overseas 
trades. 
(i) Points in question regarding formation of big corporate groups 
Big six corporate groups， less than 200 compnies of which have 
more than 8， 000 subsidaries， have far reaching influences on ]apanese 
economy， though they are in competition with each other for the ex-
pansion of market share in domestic and overseas trades. The Anti-
monopoly Act， inaddition to the protection of fair competition， aims 
at the prevention from economic concentration. Such an integrated 
economic concentration as a corporate group often makes a background 
(16) 
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of the restriction of competition in each separate market. Besides 
that， the economic concentration itself has an effect to limit economic 
freedom of each enterpriser， so no control given to this， further 
spread of economic unbalance would threaten to crack down on“free 
economic system" itself. 
(ii) Points in question regarding taking advantage of favourable 
trading position 
It cannot be denied that the Sδgδ-Shosha threatens to abuse its 
position becasue of having so strong power to subsidaries， for example， 
extortion of shareholding from customers， or enforcement on them of 
sending directors is conditioned on commencement or continuity of 
dealings， or enforcement of a disadvantage is conditioned on a financial 
assistance. 
(3) Tentative Amendment Draft of the Act 
-Review of Anti-monopoly Policy 
Based upon the above mentioned result of investigation， the Co-
mmission published in 1974 a tentative draft for sharp amendment of 
the Act， which includes some important market structure controls of 
“corporate division" and “strengthening of limitation of shareholding"， 
from a new stand point that the prevention of economic concentration 
should also be a major purpose of Antimonopoly Policy， so the Act 
should naturally inc1ude market structure control as one of the 
purposes in itself. 
From this drastic tentative draft arose a number of heated con-
troversies for or against it.41) In spite of strong objections from the 
MITI and the business world叫， a majority of opinion basically supported 
this draft. 
The reasons could be summarized as follows: 
(i) Removal of monopolistic situation is necessary for the who-
lesome development of “free market economy". Corporate division is 
an unavoidabl巴 wayfor the recovery of competition in a market， and 
any change of economic structure would be meaningless with no adop-
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tion of corporate division. 
(ii) Enactment of“corporate division" is at the present stage 
necessary as a preventive device as well as for the recovery of com-
petition， as far as it can be applied only where competition recovery 
would otherwise be impossible. In this regard， Professor Shigekazu 
Imamura，44) supporting the draft， said the following: 
“It could be considerably attributed to the deficiency in the en-
forcement rather than the defects of existing law that such provisions 
as prohibiting private monopoly， or limiting merger and acquisition of 
share or assets for the purpose of the maintenance of competitive 
market have become of no use against the concentration of economic 
power. The Commission has been consistently passive in the enforce-
ment of private monopoly and merger provisions. So that a fact that 
a business company could virtually become a holding company with no 
limitation has resulted in the concentration of huge economic power 
into big corporate groups， nevertheless a pure holding company is 
absolutely prohibited (see s. 9). Now that the existing Act has no 
effect against such an oligopolistic market structure， the enactment of 
provision for market structure control， such as“corporate division" 
is necessary for the purpose of excluding market control by high 
oligopoly， it is not enough only to strengthen the enforcement of the 
Act". 
Concerning this problem Professor Yoshio Kanazawa制 alsosaid: 
“A conception of‘corporate division' comes out of a necessity 
that market structure itself should be reformed so that effective 
competition may function well. It does concern with the presence of a 
situation in which no effective competition exists in a market. In 
such a situation recovery of competition is necessary， but it is beyoild 
the existing Act and needs a change of idea". 
My opinion in this point is a litle different from the above two 
opmlOns: 
“The goal of Anti-monopoly Policy is to maintain and promote 
free competitive economy， i. e.‘free enterprise'， but the purpose， for 
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which such a system should be maintained， iscomposed of the follo-
wing two: one is a political purpose that as much freedom of enterprise 
as possible should be secured by this system， which means as much 
freedom from intervention of political power and as much freedom 
from interference of economic control power (big business or corporate 
group)， as possible， since this system is an institution based upon 
fundamantal principle of democracy. Therefore， itis ncecessary and 
unavoidable as a major proposition for the realization of this purpose 
to eliminate excessive economic concentration or at least to prevent 
from it. In this sense market structure control， inmy opinion， should 
be naturally incJuded in the Antimonopoly Policy. An economic 
purpose of protection of competitive function， such as improvement of 
efficiency， scale economy， or economic development through it， should 
be legally evaluated only so far as the political purpose is satisfied. 
Therefore， even if economic concentration results in an improved 
economic efficiency， if it results in depriving each person of‘freedom 
of fair economic opportunity' and in expanded governmental power for 
control over it， free market economy and democracy on which it is 
based would be at a crisis of collapse. In short， the protection of 
competition would be significant only in a market with economic 
power eliminatedぺ胡〉
At any rate， the necessity for market structure control has been 
generally accepted in spite of strong objection from the MITI and 
the business world. 
IV. Enactment of Provisions for Market 
Structure Control 
The Act was amended to a wide extent in 1977， but in this paper 
discussion is limited to the following two points. 
(1) Legal Control over a Monopoli8tic Situation 
(8. 2 (7)， (8)， 8-4) 
Under the old Act there was no way to recover the competition 
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in a market even where a monopolistic situation came out in a ordinary 
course of business such as a natural monopoly. The 1977 amended 
Act provides a provision for control against such a situation for the 
following reasons: (i) a controlled price prone to happen in such a 
situation is undesirable from the point of maintenance and furtherance 
of fair competition， (i) a prevention of iIl effects of a highly oligo-
polistic market is necessary. 
(A) Requirements for a Monopolistic Situation 
(i) Extent and Scale of Market 
A market scale is required to be a large business field in which 
the total amount of domestic supplies for past one year of “specified 
goods" (or services) and “similar goods" is over￥50， 000， 000， 000. 
(about A $ 500，000，000). 
“Specified good" means the same kind of goods， the function and 
use of which are the same， plus those goods which can be supplied 
with no substantial change to the facilities or modes necessary for an 
ordinary business of the goods. In short， a group of goods which 
consist of“specified goods" include not only goods in actual competi-
tive relation， but also goods in potential competitive relation， which 
would have enough probability to change into them with ease if atte-
ntion is paid to the facilities and modes. 
(i) Market Structure 
This is that the market share ratio in the business field of 
specified and similar goods of one company is over 50必 orthat of 
two companies is over 75~ぢ and a new entry into the business field of 
specified goods is substantially difficult. Generally speaking， a new 
entry obstacle could be said to be high in its grade in such a business 
field as Gulliver's style market in which one company holds 50~ぢ
market share or two companies hold over 75 % market share. This 
requirement depends upon the fund needed for a new entry， the 
necessity for high technology or the extent of products discriminati-
on， but it would be separately and concretely judged on the basis of 
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a synthetic analysis of existence of potential competitors， fact of a 
new entry in the past or elements to induce a new entry.47) 
(ii) I1 Effects 
This requirement is a downward inflexibi1ity of price for a consi. 
derable period (usually 3 years) and the gain of exorbitantly unrea-
sonable excess profits or expenditure of exorbitantly unreasonable 
sales costs and general management expenses. The first requirement 
is whether a price of specified goods is sharp in increase or a very 
little in decrease upon comparison with the change of demand and 
supply and supplying costs for a considerable period. The second 
requirement is whether th巴 enterpriserconcerned gains a profit exo・
rbitant1y exceeding a standard profit rate， which is determined by the 
government ordinance in regard to the type of industry in which he 
is engaged， or whether the enterpriser concerned spends sales costs 
and general managment expenses exorbitantly exceeding a standard， 
which is determined by the government ordinance in regard to the 
business field to which he belongs.48) 
(B) Investigation of and Necessary Measures for， a 
Monopolistic Situation 
An investigation of monopolistic situation is made as a part of the 
research on actual economic conditions by the Economic Department 
of the Commission (s. 35-40)， though the Department can do it upon 
its own proper authority granted by section 40. When considering 
that a monopolistic situation exists， the Department must report it 
to the Commission (s. 45). The Commission can order the enterpriser 
a partial transfer of its business or other measures necessary for the 
recovery of competition of the goods (or services) concerned (s. 8-4 
(1)). However， inthis case the Commission must take the following 
matters into consideration: business performance whthout a hitch of 
the enterpriser and his linked enterprisers， stabi1ization of the 
enterpriser's employee， etc.49) Moreover， the Commission is under the 
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following duties in its inspection and decision procedures; duty to give 
notice to the competent Minister (s. 45-2)， duty to consult with the 
competent Minister before the commencement of decision (s. 49 (4))， 
duty to hold a public hearing before the commencement of decision 
(s. 75-3). These duties， which were added by a strong assertion of 
the MITI in the course of the Diet's discussion， are one major reason 
by which this market structure control has been emasculated. 
(C) Negative Requirements 
Differently from the proceedings for elimination of a contravened 
conduct (s. 7， 17-2， 20) only a measure necessary for recovery of 
competition from a monopolistic situation is market structure control 
which premises no existence of a contravened conduct. Therefore， a 
certain limitation is given to the control. 
In the following cases no measure necessary for competition reco・
very must be taken. 
(i) such a measure would result in so much reduction of business 
scale and so much unsoundness of management that supply costs might 
increase sharply， or 
(ii) such a measure would result in making it impossible to main-
tain the international competitive abi1ity， or 
(ii) there are any other ways that would make it enough possible 
to recover competition. 
The above negative repuirements are quite different in nature 
from the theory of competition on which market structure control is 
based. Therefore， itcould be said that this is a kind of compromise 
between the competition theory and the price policy or overseas 
economic policy， and that this also is the other major reason by which 
this market structure control has been emasculated. 
(2) Strengthened Prevention from Economic Concentration 
The merger law has been partially strengthened by the 1977 Ame-
ndment as follows: 
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(A) Limitation of Merger (s. 15) 
No amendment has been made in regard to section 15 itself in 
1977， but the Commission published an examination test (guidelines) 
for merger in 1980. According to it， stress of the substantial exama-
intion is placed on the following case: 
(i) the market share ratio of either of companies concerned or 
the total market share of the both， in a market to which either of 
them belongs is (a) over 25弘 (b)the first rank and over 15弘 or
(c) the first rank and large difference in comparison to the market 
share ratio of the second or the third company， 
(i) the market share ratio of either of companies concerned or 
the total market share ratio， in a market to which either of them 
belongs， iswithin the third high rank and the total market share 
ratio til1 the third is over 50弘
(ii) the number of competitors in a market to which either of 
companies concerned belongs is considerably few， 
(iv) the nominal assets of either of companies concerned are over 
￥100，000，000.- (about A $ 1，000，000，000.-) and those of the other 
company are over￥10，000，000.-(about A $100， 000， 000.一)
When it is judged if a proposed merger is substantially to restrict 
the compeititon in a specified market， the Commission examines as a 
rule the merger separately in accordance to the type of merger， which 
includes horizontal， vertical， or conglomerate merger. 
However， this test is only administrative guideline for the selection， 
according to which it is decided if a proposed merger is subject to a 
substantial examination or only a formal examination. So it is doubtful 
until a judicially established interpretation of section 15， which was 
already mentioned， has changed for the severe， whether the section 
can be said to have become severer in the enforcement by this. 
(B) Strengthened Limition of Shareholding by a Big Company 
So called “corporate integration" and “formation of corporate 
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group"， which were already mentioned， were realized through corporate 
mergers， above al the mutual share holding among members of “Pre-
sident Meetingヘandbetween members and quasi-members within the 
same group. 
Therefore， the 1977 Amendment needed to strengthen the limitation 
of shareholding by a big company. A new provision (s. 9-2) was 
enacted for this purpose: 
(i) Limitation of the Total Amount， within Which a Big 
Company can Hold Shares. 
This is a new provision for the purpose of the prevention of 
excessive economic concentration， mainly for the restriction of share 
holding by the Sogδ-Shδsha. A corporation， the purpose of which is a 
business other than financial business and the capital amount of which 
is over￥10， 000， 000， 000.-(about A $100， 000， 000.-) or the amount of net 
assets of which is over￥30，000，000，000.-(about A $300，000，000.-)， is
prohibited from acquiring or holding shares of domestic companies， 
where the total amount of costs at which the corporation acquires or 
holds is to exceed either of the capital amount or the net assets 
amount， which is larger. 
This section is said to aim at preventing from excessive concentra-
tion of business control power， and restricting shareholding with the 
total amount of held shares in due consideration of the necessity on 
the side of subsidaries， that a parent company's shareholding is indi-
spensable to its subsidaries in their business.52) 
(ii) Strengthened Maximum of Shareholding by Financial 
Companies. 
The amended section 11 raised the maximum， within which a fina-
cial company can acquire or hold shares， from 10勿 to5 % of aIl the 
issued shares of a domestic company.問 Thisamendment is based upon 
the reason why a 10~彰 share holding is enough to be a big shareholder 
and to be in a position to control a company， together with the huge 
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loan amount to it because of the wide spread of shareholding in 
connection with a remarkable increase in the capital amount per 
company. This was proved by the fact that a big bank is situated at 
the centre of each big corporate group， with a big trading comapny 
(the Sδgδ-Shosha). 
v. Conclusion 
(1) Summary of Japanese Antimonopoly Policy and 
Points in Question 
Quite different1y from western countries with a long history of 
Antitrust or unfair trade practices， ]apanese Antimonopoly Policy and 
Act were absolutely unfamiliar to the ]apanese people after the Second 
World War. The original Act 1947 was enacted after the model of 
American Anti -trust Statutes (Sherman Act and Clayton Act) under 
the guidance of the GHQ. 
Therefore， most ]apanese people had litt1e direct interest in and 
little knowledge of， the Act and its real legislative purpose for the 
time being， but to the contrary the Act appeared to be a law to rest-
rict freedom of enterprise to the business world. So it seems to have 
been treated as so-called “an uninvited visitor"， and it cannot be denied 
that a kind of hosti1ity towards this Act sti1 remains in the subcon司
scious current of many ]apanese business men. The very existence of 
the Act and the Commission in charge of the enforcement were not 
widely known to the people unti1 a great number of pernicious con・
traventions of the Act and its special statutes， above al， misleading 
or false advertisements of consumer goods or real estates， and custo-
mer inducement with unreasonable gifts or premiums， began to be 
reported as a large campaign for consumer protection by major news-
papers in early 1960s. This is the first step to a general recognition 
of the Act. It is only in early 1970s that not only the existence 
itself， but also the real purpose of the Act， and the Commission's role 
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have become well known to ]apanese people. It was just the time 
when， as already mentioned，“crazy price increase" attacked them. 
Therefore， itis no exaggeration to say that at this time they have 
come to the real understanding of the Act not as an alien， but as 
their own law. 
In this sense the t巴ntativedraft above mentioned could be under-
stood as the public opinion at that time. Nevertheless， the 1977 amended 
Act has been emasculated in the course of the Diet's discussion of the 
Bil1 by strong objections from politician and bureaucracy， at least as 
far as it was concerned with market structure. 
According to the recent investigation report of the Commission 
the provision for strengthened limitation of shareholding by big busi-
ness has gradual1y become effective， especial1y succeeded in the elimi-
nation of the Sogo-Shδsha's integrated economic power. 
However， itshould be noted that big six corporate groups and 
big ten manufacturing companies' groups stil remain powerful and 
especial1y big corporate groups stil1 exist in another form， in which 
share holding ratio of each member of each group has been remarkably 
decreased to within the statutory maximum (average ratio is said to 
be less than 10%)， but the decrease is mainly due to the increased 
number of mutual shareholding companies. At any rate， itcan be said， 
]apanese Antimonopoly Policy aims at the maintenance and furtherance 
of “free market economyぺwhile preventing from the excessive 
economic concentration. Therefore Antimonopoly Act as the realization 
of the Policy is designed to contribute to the public interest i. e. the 
interest of general consumer as its ultimate purpose by way of the 
protection of fair competition as its direct purpose. Though the Act 
itself is not perfect yet， it is could be said that the fundamental rules 
of the Policy have been widely accepted by ]apanese people in the 
course of 40 years experience. 
(2) Comparative Study with Australian Competition Policy 
The Australian Competition Policy seems to be considerably differ-
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ent from ]apanese Antimonopoly Policy. Reference to it in this paper 
is limited to the controI against monopolization and merger. 
Australian Competition Policy is said to have a double thrust: 
one is“to strengthen the competitiveness of private enterprise at the 
various levels of production and distribution of industrial and consumer 
goods and services which contributes to the benefit of the public as 
ultimate consumers and to the benefit of business in generalぺandthe 
other is 'to strengthen the position of consumers relative to producers 
and distributors which contributes to the benefit of consumers (and 
ethical traders) and to the benefit also of the competitive process".叫
And it is said also that the trade practices provisions of the Trade 
Pracrices Act 1974 (Cth) are really “competition provisions" and the 
consumer protection provisions are really provisions for “fair play in 
competitions"， and that the provisions， each affecting the same compa. 
nies， dovetai! with each other.田〕
Further it is said:“There is Iarge common interest between 
business and the community in the private enterprise system if the 
Act works well. Business prosperity through effiency and competition 
furthers not only the gains of private business， but aIso， above aIl， the 
interests of the community".56l 
The Iatest Annual Report， moreover， says as folIows: 
“The fundamental objective of the Act is to seek real consumer 
(i. e. community) benefit. That is what competition should bring， 
through the increased industry efficiency it encourages. It is what 
efficient industry structure should bring， through utiIising scale economy 
and ecnouraging what competition is possible. It is what consumer 
protection administration should bring by pressing competition into 
the area of quality and price， by helping consumers to exercise more 
effective power in the market ...... Industry should benefit from 
al this . . . . . ， and through industry benefit comes consumer benefit."57l 
In short， Australian competition policy aims at the strengthening 
of the competitiveness of private enterprise on one side， which con・
tributes to the public benefit and the benefit of business in general， 
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and on the other side， itaims at the strengthening of the relative 
position of consumers， which contributes to the consumer benefit and 
the benefit of the competitive process. The former is the purpose of 
competition law， and the latter is the purpose of consumer protection 
law. 
As far as competition law is concerned， the fundamental thinking 
seems to be that there is a large common interest (benefit) between 
enterprise and the community， and the benefit of community is furthe-
red by the business prosperity through efficiency and competition: 
that is， there is no public benefit where there is no business prosperity. 
In other words， the benefit of business in general seems to be 
preferential to a benefit of the public. Therefore， itcan be said that 
the most important is the increased industry efficiency. The compe-
tition provison seems to have been enacted on the basis of the above 
idea. This would be made clearer by reference to provisions for 
monopolization and merger. 
At any rate the following should be noted in order to understand 
Australian Policy: 
“The competition that is a main objective of the Act needs to be 
understood in its Australian context. It is the real competition that 
exists and the potential competition that is attainable in Australia 
having regard to structure， technology and market size， and often it 
wi1l have to be the competition of the few."58) 
Because， itis just in this aspect that the characteristic of Aust-
ralian competition policy and law can be found. 
(A) Monopolization 
In Australian industry in which almost al markets are small in 
scale， and more than a half of al the industries are in highly oligo-
polistic situations， it is thought， the formation of monopoly as a result 
of efficient competition is unavoidable. Therefore， socalled“natural 
monopoly" is not within control of the competition law. It is“mono-
polization"， i.e. the abuse of monopolistic position， not “monopoly" 
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itself， that should be legally prohibited. From this point only predatory 
or anticompetitive conducts (s. 46 (1) (a)~(c)) by a company in a 
situation to control a market are prohibited under section 46. This 
prohibition is absolute and differently from merger no authorization is 
granted. However， there is a most difficult problem of evidence， 
whether a company takes advantage of the power that is has by virtue 
of being in a position substantially to control a market “for the 
purpose of" eliminating or substantially damaging a competitor， preven-
ting the entry of a person into the market， or detering or preventing 
a person from engaging in competitive conduct in the market. Owing 
to such a position necessarily accompanying with anticompetitive 
effects， more or less， inmost cases， a monopoly itse!f would not be 
allowed， ifthe phrase，“for the purpose" would be interpreted in 
accordance with an objective standard.62) To the contrary a company's 
subjective intention of“abuse" could not be proved with ease， if it 
would be interpreted according to a subjective standard， so that the 
applicable extent of section 46 can not but be restricted so widely.附
A majority opinion supports the latter. Accordingly the number of 
section 46 contravention cases is a very few. The latest TPC annual 
report says，“a number of investigations were carried out as a result 
of complaints， while no section 46 cases were brought in the year under 
review."65) This is probably due to the above reason， inaddition to the 
strict requirement of “in a position substantially to control a market." 
From the above mention the present section 46 could be said to 
be an existence as“a neverdrawn heirloom swordヘwhichis of no 
practical effectiveness. 
(B) Merger 
A remarkable feature of Australian Merger Law (the 1977 Amend-
ment) exists in the authorization system. As already mentioned， 
Australian competition law has basically put emphasis on the increase 
or improvement of industry efficiency rather than the maintenance and 
furtherance of competition itself. Therefore， asfar as it is satisfied， 
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whether through an enterpriser's internal efforts or merger， itseems 
to be thought “unavoidable" that the competition in a market should 
be sacrificed to some extent， because only this increased efficiency 
would bring about the business prosperty -the benefit of industry in 
general-， through which a benefit of the public would be brought 
about. 
The authorization system seems to have been established on the 
above grounds. Only when “it is satisfied in al the circumstances 
that the proposed acquisition would result or be likely to result， in 
such a benefit to the public that the acquisition should be allowed to 
take place" (s. 90(9))， authorization is granted by the Commission. 
In short， authorization is granted on the basis of “public benefit"， 
or“a benefit of the public". On this concept has been put a definite 
quasi-judicial interpretation: 
“The choice of a wider expression was deliberate， as pointing to 
some wider conception of the public interest， though no doubt the 
intetests of the public as purchasers consumers， or users must fal 
within it".“This we see as anything of value to the community gene-
rally， any contribution to aims pursued by the society including as one 
of its principal elements (in the context of trade practice legislation) 
the achievement of the economic goal of efficiency and progress. If 
this conception is adopted， itis clear that it would be possible to 
argue in some cases that a benefit to the members or employees of 
corporation involved served some acknowledged end of public policy， 
even though no immediate or direct benefit to others was demonstra-
ble".67) 
In other words，“when the consequences of the applicant's conduct 
are capable of being described as socially beneficial in that they 
promote some economic or social aim of society there is a benefit to 
the public".68) 
The term “the public" is understood to mean more than mere 
consumers， and scale economy and considerable cost curtailment in 
goods supply can be a substantial benefit to the public， even though 
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they are not reflected in price decrease， and a benefit to shareholders 
by a higher rate of stock divident can be appropriate for a benefit to 
the public in some cases.刷
At any rate， when the Commission considers that the public bene-
fit in the above meaning would be or be likely to be as a consequence 
of a proposed merger， authorization is granted to the merger， which 
would otherwise be a contravention of section 50.70) 
In regard to the actual enforcement of merger law the 7th Annual 
Report says:“Since 1977 the Act al10ws nearly al mergers to proceed 
without risk. Some merger investigations were undertaken in response 
to complaints from companies during the year. In no cas巴 didthe 
Commission feel that it should challenge a proposed merger."71) The 
9th Report says:“The level of Commission involvement in mergers 
and acquisitions has increased significantly since last year. Much of 
this has not been in adjudication work， but in compliance work. The 
reason is that authorization for mergers and acquisitions is rarely 
sought these days as companies usual1y prefer to take their own risk 
when. they believe there is no dominance likely to be acquired or 
increased."72) 
Also the latest Report says，“In 1983~ 1984 the Commission con-
sidered about 100 merger or acquisition proposals， about the same as 
the previous year. In most of them the Commission decided that 
there was no section 50 contravention， without approaching the parties 
involved."73) 
From the above Reports it is c1ear that about 100 merger and 
acquisition cases per year proceed with no risk， and authorization is 
granted to even a very few applications. Judging from the wide and 
obscure contents of“the public benefit" concept， itwould be rather 
difficult for the Commission to grant no authorization to applied 
mergers. 
Thus， Australian industry seems to be moving toward more exce・
ssive concentration of economic power for a good cause of“increased 
industry efficiency". 
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Moreover， unfortunately the present merger law has a material 
defect that， once a company has taken such a position to control or 
dominate a market， the company can enjoy its position under the 
protection of the law， because it is exposed to no danger of“takeover"， 
since no company can acquire it without section 50 contravention.問
(C) Summary-Points in Question 
In order to improve the above defects which the existing provisi-
ons for monopolization and merger have， the amendment of sections 
46 and 50 were proposed in the Trade Practices Amendment Exposure 
Draft， which was published in 1984. However， these proposals were 
not adopted into the 1984 Amendment Bil. 
The proposed seCtion 46 provides to replace “a corporation that 
is in a position substantially to control a market" with “a corporation 
that has a substantial degree of power in a market"， for the purpose 
of widening the applicable extent of section 46. Regarding section 50 
it is proposed that the control or dominance test should be replaced 
with a test of“substantial lessening of competitionぺandthe existing 
authorization on the public benefit grounds remaining， a pre-merger 
clearance procedure should be reintroduced， which is only for comfor司
mity with the present practices. 
(D) My opinion 
Australian Competition Policy and law have no provisions and also 
no attempt to control the market structure itself. This is based upon 
the peculiar character of Australian Competition Policy. It is c1ear 
that Australian competition law aims at the maintenance of“free 
market economyヘbutthe ways or methods for realization are quite 
unique and peculiar. 1t could be said that Australian competition policy 
is based upon a kind of philosophy that the increase or improvement 
of industry efficiency is supreme， since it is an origin from which al 
benefits， above al， a benefit to the public would come out. This 
philosophy is a kind of“expected harmony doctrine" that an increased 
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industry efficiency should bring about a benefit， direct or indirect， 
and it is only an expectation， but its reaIization has no security at aII. 
As already mentioned， Japanese Anti-monopoly Policy as well as 
American Antitrust Policy has been based upon this kind of philosophy， 
that the very maintenance and furtherance of“free and fair competi-
tion" would result in bringing about the public interest which means 
an interest of generaI consumer， and being in comformity to the 
political principles of democracy. 
In both countries， however， this philosophy has been proved to be 
ineffective because of their failure to satisfy the very important 
premise of“the necessity for elimination of excessive economic con-
centration." 
Australian authorization system based upon such an expected 
harmony doctrine would result in allowing excessive economic concen-
tration by ways of merger and acquisitions of assets more and more， 
in some cases at the sacrifice of the competition in a market. 
As already stated， the iI effects brought about through economic 
concentration are not only substantial or material to the people's 
economic welfare， but also raise more important social and political 
problems without faiI. 1 wonder if Australian Competition Policy which 
puts too much stress on economic efficiency with no regard to the 
politicaI purpose is reasonable. Because this problem has essentially 
no direct relation with market scale; and even if the market scale is 
small， the influence of these il effects to the public would be more 
material in inverse proportion to it. 
24th of June， 1985 
Note. This paper was written just one year ago at Monash University， 
Melbourne， Australia. In regard to the Australian Competition 
PoIicy， see the following recent papers; Ryozo Kato.“The Law of 
AustraIian Monopoly and Merg巴rs" (1)~(3) ， Nanzan Law Review， 
Vo1. 9 No. 2-4， 1985-6. 
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(dited as“R. Kato， (1)") 
3)“Private monopoly" does not mean socalled monopoly， but it is a 
special concept of Japanese Anti-monopoly Act. It is defined in section 
2 subsection 5; private monopoly means that a company restricts 
substantial1y the competition in a specified market against the public 
interest， separately， inconbination or in conspiracy with other conpany. 
4)“Undue restraint of trade" means that a company restricts substanti-
al1y the competition in a specified market against the public interest 
through a mutual binding or performance of business activities by way 
of determination， maintenance or raising of price or restriction of 
amount produced， technologies， products manufactured， facilities or 
customers， in cooperation with other companies， whether by contract 
or agreement， or in any other way. Even now it is said in the business 
world that there are many supporters of cartel agreement. Therfore， 
the number of unlawful cartel agreement is extremely big. 
5)“Unfair method of trade"means the conducts below which threaten to 
hinder fair competition and are specified by the Commission: 
1. undue treatment of other companies， 
2. dealings with undue price， 
3. undue inducement or compel1ing of competitors' customers to deal 
with， 
4. dealings under cnditions unduely to restrict other party's business 
activities， 
5. dealings with other party by way of undue taking advantage of 
bargaining position etc. 
6) Janes C. Thomas， Conglomerate Merger Syndrone-A Comparison Con-
gressional Policy and Enforcement Policy， 36 Fordham L. R. 510 (1968) 
(34) 
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(see further R. Kato， (1) pp. 77~78) 
7) See R. Kato， (1)， op. cit.， pp. 90~101 
8) Blake & Jones， In Defense of Antitrust， 65 Colum. L. R. 382 (1965) 
9) See R. Kato， (1)， op. cit， p.130 
9~2) Thomas， op. cit.， pp. 519~528 
(See further R. Kato， (1)， op. cit.， pp. 77~78) 
10) • Regarding the tendency of buisness concentration in England， 
see， Sam Aaronovitch & Malcolm C. Sawyer， Big Rusiness: Theore-
tical and Empirical Aspects in the Concentration and Mergers 
in the United Kingdom， 1975 p. 123 
R. Kato， Competition Policy and Anti-merger in England， Kosei-
Torihiki， Special Issue No. 323 pp. 31~38 Sept. 1977 (cited as 
“R. Kato， (2)") 
• Regarding the concentration of economic powers and the problems 
see， Aaronvitch & Sawyer， op. cit.， pp. 205-206 
R. Kato， (2)， op. cit.， p.33 
11) James P. Cunningham， The Fair Trading Act 1973 pp. 107-108 
(Cf. R. Kato， (2)， op. cit.， p.34) 
12) The original section 15 of the Act was very severe to corporate me-
rgers; al mergers were prohibited as a principle because a merger 
was thought to be the most powerful and effective means to monopoly. 
The first amendment of 1949 abolished authorization procedure and 
adopted clearance procedure in place of it. 
The second amendment of 1953 eliminated the most important item， 
that is“where a merger would result in giving birth to an undue 
difference in business activities". 
13) The existing merger provisions of the Act are following: 
(A) Limitation of merger (Sectin 15) 
A company is prohibited from merger in the following case; 
1. A merger would result in being substantially to restrict the 
compeqtion in a specified market， or 
2. A merger is by way of unIair method of trade. 
(B) Limitation of acquisition of shares (Section 10) 
A company is prohibited from acquring or holding the shares of 
a domestic company， where the acquisition or holding would result 
in being substantially to restrict the competition in a specified 
(35) 
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market， or where it is by way of unfair method of trade. 
(C) Limitation of transfer of business (Section 16) 
The provision of Section 15 is applied to the following case: 
1. when a company acquires al or a substantial part of the dome-
stic business of other company， or 
2. when a company acquires al or a substantial part of the dome-
stic business assets of other company， or 
3. when a company leases al or a substantial part of the domestic 
business of other company， or 
4. when a company accepts the management of al or a substantial 
part of the domestic business of other company as a nominee， or 
5. when a company makes a contract sharing the profit and loss 
of the domestic business with other company. 
14) Fair Trade Commission， On the Recent Corporate Merger Movements， 
Kosei -Torihiki， No. 250 (1971) pp. 10-11 
The table below indicates the number of clearances applied by the 
Commission from 1955 to 1969 
Year 
No.of 
A盟主主tion
Year 
No.of 
Application 
11955 ¥附¥1957 ¥ 1958 ¥脚¥1960 ¥捌i雌¥19田i
|338 ¥組|湖|加 |ω| 必0¥ 日1¥ 7151抑|
|19倒 119田 119661196711968 119印 l19701
1864 ¥制 1871 1腕¥1020 111631 1471 
15) Above al， student movements in univerities located in big cities such as 
Tokyo， Osaka， and Nagoya were most radical and sometimes just like 
a civil war. Most of univerities were unlawfully occupied by radical 
leftwing students and could not help stopping their functions for 
several months， insome university nearly half a year. 
16) Fair Trade Commission， op. cip.， pp. 12-13 
17) In the United States of America even after the 1950 Amenment of Sec-
tion 7 of the Clayon Act merger movements， itis said， did not cease; 
nay， itrather advanced. 
But the type of merger great1y changed and shifted from traditional 
horizontal or vertical merger to conglomerate merger. 
Nearly 90% of the total mergers which took place after 1960 is said 
to have been conglomerate mergers. This is due to the reason that 
(36) 
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the 1950 amended Section 7 prohibited al horizontal and vertical mer-
gers， but treated conglomerate merger as least illegaL (Cf_ Turner， 
Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act， 78 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1313-1322 (1961): R. Kato， (1)， op.cit.， pp.149-150). 
The table below indicates the transition of the number of mergers 
which took place for seven years from 1960 to 1966 in the U. S. A.. 
Year 1 1960 1 1961 1雌 1196311蜘 1196511966 
Total Number 11，州問411，667い，41911，797卜，州問6
AlI Acquisition |山611，州問41四 91日 911，6281川
artial Acqu刷
18) Warren Pengi1ey， Competition Policy and Law Enforcement; Rambl-
ings on Rhetoric and Reality， 2 A. ]. L. S. 1 pp. 1-29 
19) Pengi1ey， Ibid.， p.4 
He says in his paper: 
“For poIiticians， an ideal competition poIicy is one which supports the 
concept of competition whi1e not allowing this to alienate important 
sectional interests. Certainly one of the major problems of competition 
law from the politican viewpoint is that competition is politically blind." 
“Competition is， in theory， part of the “free enterprise" system. The 
vested interests which support free enterprise rhetoric often， however， 
oppose law giving effect to competition policy." (Ibid.， pp. 7-8) 
20) R. Kato， (1)， op.cit.， pp.199-202 
The MITI's view of the relationship between two polices is not reaso・
nable， because the very antimonopoly policy is the mOst fundamental 
of al national or govermental polices: the industrial structure policy 
in charge of the MITI can be effective only as far as it is in confor-
mity with the antimonoply policy. 
(see， further R. Kato， (1)Ibid.， pp.201-202). 
In addition， a question of constitutionality of such an administrative 
guidance without legal ground has recent1y been resolved in its favour 
by the Supreme Court's judgement on a cartel case. 
21) S. Imamura， The Amendment Movement of the Anti-monopoly Act， 
Gendai Keizai， No. 14 (Autumn 1974)， p.80 
(37) 
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22) See FN 13) 
23) The Toho and others v. FTC (Fair Trade Commission)， 6 Civil Law 
Report (Higher Court) 3， p.868 (1953) : 3 FTC Decision Report 44 (1950) 
24) The Supreme Court's judgement regarding the interpretation of this 
phrase is the same as this (8 Civil Law Report (Supreme Court) 5 
p. 950). 
And also the majority opinion is the same: it understands it as the 
restriction so effective that other companies can not carry on the 
effective competition in the market. 
24) See FN 14) 
26) This is basically the same opinion as the High Cout's. 
27) 1n case of four articles in question， such as railway rail， tin-plate， 
casting pig and steel arrow plate， itwas clear that the new company 
would be in a position to control the market after the merger and 
would substatially restrict the competition in the relevant market， 
which the Commission acknowleged. 
28) Th巴 contentsof the proposed counter plans are as follows:・
1. Railway rail: 
① a new entry of Nihn Kokan to the market 
② the transfer of Kamaishi factory to Nihon Kokan 
③ the technical assistance of new company to Nihon Kokan 
2. Tin-plate: 
① the transfer of al shares of Toyo Koban， which Yawata holds， 
to Nihon Kokan and Toyo Seikan， 
② the formation of subsidary relation between Toyo Koban and 
Toyo Seikan 
3. Casting pil: 
the transfer of Yawata's furnace (No. 6) to Nihon Kokan 
4. Steel arrow plate: 
① the offer of know-how from Yawata to Nihon Kokan 
② the offer of know-ho'w from Fuji to Kawasaki Seitetsu. 
29) To this Commission's decision a number of critics were given. 
S. 1mamura， Selected 100 Decisions and Judgements of Anti-monopoly 
Act (hereafter cited as“句SelectedDecisions and Judgement匂s"つ)
S. Tanaka， op. cit.， pp. 198-199 
A. Kaneko， Selected Decisions and Judgements (3rd. ed) Jurist No. 81 
(38) 
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(1984) pp. 113-115 
Cf. R. Kato， (1)， op. cit.， pp. 65-67. 
This merger is said to have been strongly supported by the MITI. 
30) The Commission published a guideline in regard to the examination 
of merger in 1980 for the purpose of strengthening the enforcement 
of merger law in in relation to the 1977 Amendment. 
31) See FN 3) 
32) The Nihon Sekiyu Unso Co. case (FTC Decision Report vol. 3， p.73) 
This is a case of vertical share acquisition. 
See， M. Sanekata， Selected Decision and Judgements (2nd ed.) p. 126 
T. Okushima， Selected Decision and Judgements (3rd ed.) p. 108 
33) In 1973 and 1974 the Congress passed the Ammendment Bill for the 
strengthening of Auditor's power for the prevention from make-up 
settlement of accounts， with an incidental condition that a special 
provision for corporate social responsibility should be enacted in the 
Company Act in near future. 
On the other side， the Congress enacted a special statute for the 
prevention of undue corner and undue indisposition to sell goods in 
1974. 
34) In relation to the above Congress resolution a number of excellent 
articles or papers and “Corporate Social Responsibility" were published 
in the field of the law. 
R. Kato， Enterprise and Society-A Legal Study， Soshiki Kagaku， 
special issue on“Corporate Social ResponsibilityぺVol.7， No. 3 
(1973) 
I. Kawamoto， Corporate Social Responsibility-A Legal Study， Jurist， 
Special Issue on“Enterprise and SocietyヘNo.578 (1975)， 
K. Sugawara， Corporate Social Responsibility and the Management， 
Shoji Homu， No. 111 (1975)， 
S. Tanaka， Social Responsibility of Corporation-A legislative Study， 
Ajiya Law Review， vol. 9 No. 2， 
K. Nakamura， Social Rosponsibility of the Managements， Minshoho vol. 
76 No. 3， 
R. Kato， Corporate Social Responsibilityand Company Law， included in 
“The Law of the Taking Part in Management and Enterprise 
Disclosure， edited by I. Kawamoto (1979)， 
(39) 
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(Further R. Kato， The Law of Corporation (1)， FN (1) p. 2) 
35) The most distinguished of al unlawful cartel agreements which were 
exposed， was so called “unlawful oil cartel"， especially in the malignant 
oil price cartel case al defendants， (who were 12 corporate bodies and 
14 directors of these companies) were held to be guilty of“undue 
restraint of trade" in the Tokyo Higher Court in 1980. This is the first 
case in which the parties concerned were prosecuted. Recent literatures 
regarding this case are as follows:ー
S. Imamura， Oil Cartel Agreement and the Criminal Judgement， 
Jurist， Special Issue on“Oil CartelぺNo.729 (1980) p. 31， 
A. Tanso， Oil Unlawful Cartel (Price Agreement) Case， Commentary 
of the Important Cases of 1980， Jurist， Special Issue， p.263 
K. Sanekata， Review of the Criminal Judgement of Oil Cartel Agree-
ment， Kosei Torihiki， (1981) No. 364， No. 365 p. 10， p.32 
T. Fukuda， The Disputed Points of Unlawful Oil Cartel Case， Shoji 
Homu， No. 894 (1981) p. 64， 
K. Sanekata， Public Interest， Selected Decisions and Judgements (3rd 
ed.) pp. 20-21， 
R. Kato， The Time of Consummation， Selected Decisions and Judge-
ments (3rd. ed.) pp. 42-43. 
36) The Sogo・Shoshais refered to as“Big Six Comprehensive Trading 
Companies" or“Big Ten Comprehensive Trading Companies". 
The former is a name given to big six companies of Mitsubishi-Shoji， 
Mitsui-Bussan， Marubeni， Itochu， Sumitomo・Shδji，Nisho・Iwai; the 
latter is a name given to the above big six plus these four companies; 
Tomen， Kanematsu-Gosho， Ataka-Sangyo， Nichimen-Jitsugyo. 
(Table 1) The number of subsidaries of Big Six Shosha 
(the rate of shareholding is over 50%) 
(MS) (MB) (Ma) (IC) (SS) (NI) 
|MitSUMshiHl|Mitsui-||Maru jIto-Cha|| Sumitom0・ I~蜘ー
mpany ISb.oji I Bussan I Beni I HO-l，.lU IShoji I Iwai 
Domest叶 64 93 83 50 
Overse吋 30 42 38 23 
Total 94 135 121 73 
(40) 
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(Table 2) The type of industry of the above subsidaries (domestic) 
ra 1 b 1 c 1 d 1 e ¥ f ¥ g ¥ h ¥ i ¥ j ¥k 11m 1 n ¥ 0 ¥ p ¥ q 1 r 1 s ¥ t 
MSI1r 1 1 614¥ 1 ¥1111 7¥31 ¥ 4126¥ 11¥1¥ 31 4¥1 
MBI 4¥1¥1¥ 71 31 2111 51 41 3111 51 31311 1 21 ~I_:J 7_~ 
Mal 1 ¥31叫21113¥¥12¥1817126111111¥81217
IC 1 3[-11 1 81 41 2111 71 1 1 11 3同11612111419
部 11112111111113121 I同111511113¥2
NIIII171411131111161¥2711¥111131413 
Note: a: (Marine products & agriculture， forestry) b: (Mining) 
c: (Construction) d: (Foods) e: (Fibre) f: (Wooden products) 
g: (Paper & pulp) h: (Chemistry) i: (Ceramic) j: (Iron&steel) 
k: (Non-metal) 1: (Metal products) m: (Machine) 
n: (Commerce) 0: (Insurance & finance) p: (Real estate) 
q: (Transport & correspondence) r: (Warehouse) s: (Service) 
t: (Others) 
(Table 3) The situation of share holding of Big Six Shosha and Big 
Ten Makers_ 
、二 Amount of shares held I Amount of shares held 
31 Ma叫 1叫即~1974131 March 197411967~19741 
$44000||ド27，ooon|Domestic Corporate 
bodies million 6.2times m1.11.0 3.6times 
Overseas corpo吋$山OOJ54times|附 500 山 3times Bodies I millionl ~V. ~ ..u.~" I milli 
Total 内587，021.11i0 n|73times|$463，50m0Ilion1| 38ti es 
Note: The names of Ten Big Makers are as follows:・
Shin Nihon Seitetsu， Mitsubishi Juko， Toyoda， Nissan， 
Hitachi Seisaku Sho， Matsushita Denki， Nihon Kokan， 
Mitsubishi Kasei， Sumitomo Kagaku. 
(Table 4) The average percentage of share held in comparison to 
capital. 
¥ Big Ten Shδ叫BigTen Makers 
Amount of |AlI C叩 r山 6.1 times 1.1 times shares held bodies 
Capital iD-corpora te bodies 4.6 times 1.0 time 
Amount of |AIl corporm 2.4 times 0.4 time shares held bodies 
I~…山Owned Capital  ;;;~;~.t"e bodie 1. 8 times 0.3 time 
(41) 
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(Table 5) The situation of sent directors. 
I IA I B 1， ~， I c I ~ I ~ 
Big Te印nShosha I 2，822 Iω9刊|河賜|刊7ぺ12勝 1 2お58
B泡 Te印nMa比蜘kers I 1，7町 I1，4:叫号4協 14ι9叫&務 1 1印
Note: A: The :number of affi1iated companies (over 10タ shareholding)
B: The ，number of companies to which directors are sent. 
C: The total number of sent directors. 
D: The number of directors sent to companies (less than 1096 
share holding) 
37) The recent transition of mutual share holding situation amongmember 
companies of each “President Meeting" 
(Table 6) 
|Mitsub袖 ilMitsuiISumito~示日1222・同示当竺竺
31説j吋 27勝 114判 24.7% 13例初防 114.iタ118勝
沼1凱rChl 却勝|山刻 27物 17例19.2タ 116例 21妨|
(Table 7) The ratio in which the big shareholders of top three listed 
companies of each group are other member companies within 
the same group. 
¥ .. . ¥ ~ '. ~ ~ ¥ ~. _ ¥Daiichi ¥ ~. ¥ Mitsubishi I Mitsui I Sumitomo I Fuvo I~~;~':::'~，.. I Sanwa I |I.::> n: ry  .Kangin .::>an average 
部勿 1 5物 1 8務 1 51% 1 6物 1 51% 1 6防
(Table 8) The situation in which directors or high officers of member 
companies of each “President Meeting" are sent from other 
member companies within the same group (A)， and， the ratio 
of， the number of directors sent from the Sogo.Shosha and 
big bank within the same group to the total number of 
directors (B). 
Mitsub凶丙一一戸…omol
AI 9物 1 4務 l
BI 4賜 I5勝|
(42) 
。|DaMiisanwa|Kngn I va.u.YYQ. I 
6物 I 7物 I6妨 I 70 
5勝 I 3物 1 4妨 1_4妨
38) 
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(Table 9) The position occupied by the Big Six Corporate Groups in 
]apanese economy. 
I~伽.IMi叫sumv町õlT叫Dai凶-ls walGr蜘bishi lvmsull tomo I.t' uyo 11 ora11 Kngin 1 ;:，an  to.tal 
Number ofl 
Companies 制|
AICapital Ratio 2.51 4.81山|
Ass向 R叫 ~.41~1~2J 
Number of| 
Companies 2601州1，7511
BICapi凶 Rati 2.91 5.8117.61 
Assets Rati ~. 6 1_4. 7 116. 8 1 
~~m~er，_of 11. 070 1 Companies I J.， 州国~13，8291 1， 180_-' 山~Iω
CICapital Ratiol 4.31 6.8122.81 
Assぬ Ratio1 4; 0 1 5.2 118. 7 1 
Number of 114601 1367| Companies !.，"%vv ! J.， 加 11，叫
DICa向 1Rati 6. 0 1 8.1 1 28.0 1 
Assets Rati 4.3 1 5.61 20. 51 
Note: A: Only member companies of“President Meeting" 
B: Where the number of subsidaries (50~100% share holding) 
is added to A 
C : Wheret he number of subsidaries (25~509多 share holding) 
is added to B 
D : Where the number of subsidaries (10~25% share holding) 
is added to C 
39) The position occupied by the oId big four financiaI combine (the Zai-
batsu) (Mitsui， Mitsubishi， Sumitomo， Yasuda) before the end of the 
Second World War in Japanese economy was as follows: -
The number of companies having direct or indirect control over the 
domestic economy was 544， and the totaI capitaI amounts accounted 
for 24.5% of al the companies at that time in Japan. 
40) The Second Investigation Report on the Sogo.Shosha， Dokinkon 52-2， 
pp. 194-197 (22 Jan. 1975) 
41) See R. Kato， (1)， op.cit.， FN 1) and 2) pp. 163-165 
(43) 
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42) Strong opinions against the tentative amendment draft are as follows: 
Amaya， Objection to the Tentative Amendment Draft of the Anti-
monopoly Act， Economist， 19 Nov. 1974 
Keidan-ren Dokinho Kenkyu・kai，The View of the Recent Amendment 
of the Anti-monopoly Act， Kosei-torihiki， No. 284 (june 1974) 
43) See R. Kato， (1)， op. cit.， FN 2) p. 165 
44) The former President and Professor of Law of the Hokaido University， 
and the present Chairman of the Academic Association of Economic 
Law. 
S. 1mamura， The Amendment Movement of the Anti-monopoly Act. 
Gendai-keizai， No. 4 (Autumn 1974) p. 80 
45) The former Professor of Law， the University of Tokyo and Chairman 
of the Academic Association of Economic Law， 
Y. Knazawa， The Background of the Tentative Amendment Draft of 
the Anti-monopoly Act. Keizai Hyoron. special issue: The Anti-
monopoly Act， (Dec. 1974)， pp. 20-21. 
46) See further R. Kato， (1)， op. cit.， pp. 211-217 
47) M. Kikuchi， Control over a Monopolistic Situation; How to study the 
Anti-monopoply Act. p. 188 
48) The 50必 excessof a gained profit over a standard rate is regarded as 
“exorbitantly exceeding." 
1n the government ordinance the industry is divided into 12 types， and 
a standard profit rate as an index， by which a monopolistic profit can 
be judged， isthe ratio of current profits to owned capital and the 
ratio of operating profits to gross capital. 
49) These matters to be taken into consideration are understood as only 
directory provision， and even in the failure the decision of the Com-
mission is not avoidable (S. Tanaka， op. cit.， p.188) 
50) M. Kikuchi， op. cit.， p.211 
51) The exceptions are provided， but they are limited to where they are 
not ag主instthe legislative purpose or where they are unavoidable (see 
s. 9-2 (1)) 
52) The number of companies which came under section 9-2 (1) is reported 
to have been 224. 
53) The exceptions are provided， but they are limited to where they are 
unavoidable. (see s. 11 (1)). 
(44) 
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54) TPC First Annual Report (1974-75) p. 1. 
55) Id. 
56) Id. 
57) TPC Tenth Annual Report (19田-84)para 1， 3 p. 1. 
58) TPC First Annual Report， p.1. 
59) Cf. Taperell/Vermeesch/Harland， Trade Practices and Consumer 
Protection: A Commentary on the Trade Practices Act 1974 3nd. ed. 
(109) p. 10. 
Hunter， Restrictive Trade Practices and Monopolies in Australia (1961)， 
37 Economic Record 25 p. 25. 
60) See. 
Taperell/Vermeesch/Harland， op. cit.， (601) p. 290， 
Donald/Heydon， Trade Practices Act: Restrictive Trade Practices， 
Deceptive Conduct and Consumer Protection， Vo1. 1 (1978) (5.1.1) 
p.205， 
R. Kato， The Fundamental Principles and the Feature of the Austrclian 
Competition Policy， Kosei.torihiki， july 1985， 
R. Kato， The Law of Monopoly and Merger in Australia， 
-The Competition Policy and the Market Structure Coutrol.-
9 Nanzan Law Review 2， 3 and 4. 
61) Swanson Committee Report paras 6.7， 6.8 
62) Cf. Top Performance Motors Pty Ltd v. Ira Berk (Queensland) Pty 
Ltd (1975)， 5 A. L. R. 465 
63) Taperell/Vermeesch/Har1and， op. cit.， (624) p. 308. 
64) There are the following three cases in recent time: 
1. The Victorian Egg Board case (1978)， 33 F. L. R. 294 
2. The TPC v. CSBP & Farmers Ltd case (1980)， 53 F. L. R. 141 
3. The Mac1ean v. Shell Chemical (Australia) Pty Ltd (1984)， A. T. P. 
R. 45， 392. 
The first case is a typical example under section 46， the second was 
rejected because of the fai1ure in the proof of “the purposeヘandthe 
third is a case of injunction. 
65) TPC Tenth Annual Report， para 4.9.4 p. 106 
66) There are two kinds of authorization test: one is the authorization 
test in case of substantial anti-competitive contract， agreement， 
covenant， and exc1usive dealing (ss. 45， 45A， 45B， 47; 90(6)， (7))， and 
(45) 
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the other is that in case of exclusive provision， second boycotts， 
exclusive dealing and merger (ss. 45(2)， 45E， 47(6)， 50: 90(8)， (9)) 
67) QCMA/Definance (1976)， 8 A. L. R. 481 
68) Taperell/Vermeesch/Harland， op. cit.， (1221) p. 525 
69) Cf. Re Howard Smith lndustries Ltd (1977)， 28 F. L. R. 385 
70) Section 50 reads as follows: 
A corporation shall not acqiure， directly or indirectly， any shares in 
the capital， or any assets， of a body corporate if: 
(a) as a result of the acquisition， the corporation would be or be likely 
to be， in a position to control or dominate a market for goods or 
servlces， or 
(b) in a case where the corporation is in a position to control or 
dominate a market for goods or services: 
(i) the body corporate or another body corporate that is related 
to that body corporate is， or is likely to be， a competitor of 
the corporation or of a body corporate that is related to the 
corporation; and 
(i) the acquisition would or would be likely to， substantially 
strengthen the power of the corporation to control or dominate 
that market. 
71) TPC Seventh Annual Report (1980-81)， para 4.9. 1 p. 75 
72) TPC Ninth Annual Report (1982-83)， para 3.5.1 p. 59 
73) TPC Tenth Annual Report (19:邸-84)para 4. 10， 1 p. 109 
74) Trade Practices Amendment Exposure Draft， Clause 15， Explanatory 
Memorandum para 40 A. T. P. R. 30-242. 
(46) 
